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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
GRANT HILDRETH,

Appeal No. 20080615-CA

Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED IN A
CHALLENGE TO A DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR SEVERANCE;
OR,
ALTERNATIVELY,
HILDRETH
ADEQUATELY
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE

The State argues that, because a determination of severance and/or admission of
evidence under UT. R. EVID. 404(b) is fact intensive, that UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) requires
a marshaling of the evidence in such challenges. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 23-30. The
State argues that Hildreth failed to properly marshal the evidence and that it is grounds
for summary rejection of his appeal. Id. at p. 26. Unfortunately, the State has failed to
adequately support this argument with proper authority and/or analysis.
Although a determination of severance under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-l and/or
admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) are fact-intensive, their ultimate determinations
l

rest on conclusions of law rendered by the trial court under those specific provisions.
The State fails to specifically quote UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9), which indicates that, "...a
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." (Emphasis added). It does not indicate a marshaling requirement
for challenges to conclusions of law rendered by a trial court. Our appellate courts have
particularly addressed this issue and determined that a challenge to the legal sufficiency
of the findings themselves does not require a marshaling of the evidence. Jensen v.
Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, | 8 fn. 3, 203 P.3d 1020. This position is further clarified in
Kimball v. Kimball as follows:
In light of the confusion evidence in this case regarding when and how a
party must engage in a marshaling analysis, and given the oft-expressed
frustration of the bar with the marshaling requirement, we take this
opportunity to clarify what marshaling really is. In its classic application,
marshaling the evidence serves a very important function. It adds
discipline and order to challenges to factual findings, precluding an
unfocused allegation that the findings lack evidentiary support and
requiring the appellate court to comb the record and see if that might
possibly be true. Instead, the marshaling doctrine, now recognized in our
rules, see, Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)("A party challenging a fact finding
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding."), requires that counsel identify which particular findings are
challenged as lacking adequate evidentiary support and then show the court
why that is so. This can only logically be done by summarizing, or
"marshaling," whatever evidence there is that supports each challenged
finding. We emphasize that only the supporting evidence is legally relevant
and is all that counsel should call our attention to. See, Neeley v. Bennett,
2002 UT App 189, If 12, 51 P.3d 724 ("[A]n exhaustive or voluminous
recitation of all the facts presented at trial, even if this recitation includes
within its body the facts that support the challenged ruling, is not what is
expected."), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).
Ibid, 2009 UT App 233, 120 at fn. 5, 217 P.3d 733 (emphasis added in bold). The
State's recitation of the marshaling requirement is not only unfounded in its application
2

of Rule 24(a)(9) to challenges to the trial court's conclusions of law rendered under either
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-8a-l or Rule 404(b), but its case law upon which it relies has been

revisited and clarified in Kimball, supra, as applicable only to "challenges to factual
findings." The State's position is thus flawed.
Hildreth challenged the legal sufficiency of the findings, or the conclusions of law
upon which the trial court's determination under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-l was based.
The facts presented through testimony and otherwise at trial do not have a direct affect,
but are precursor only to that determination in the analysis requisite for such a challenge.
This was particularly set forth in Hildreth's extensive analysis on the issue in his opening
brief.

Clearly the State has fallen susceptible to the confusion surrounding the

marshaling requirement, as evidenced in its position in this matter.
The first severance determination for a trial court under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a1 is to decide whether the charges are unconnected in their commission. State v. Scales,
as specifically cited by Hildreth in his opening brief in this matter, indicated that a
determination under this prong of the "severance test" is very code-compliant dependent,
requiring interpretation according to the plain language of the statute. Ibid., 946 P.2d 377
(Utah App. 1997). Although it requires a look to the facts to determine if they were
unconnected, Hildreth has challenged that, given the facts as found by the trial court or
presented in the testimony and other evidence, it is obvious they are not. "[T]he grant or
denial of severance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, so we reverse [a
denial] only if the trial judge's refusal to sever charges 'is a clear abuse of discretion in
that it sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial.'" State v. Lopez, 789
3

P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App. 1990), quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977).
As cited in Hildreth's opening brief, where the question of severance presents a more
difficult issue, this Court has "resolve[d] the issue in favor of assuring the defendant a
fair trial." State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, 131, 198 P.3d 471. This "abuse of
discretion" appellate standard of review respecting denials of severance alone indicates a
challenge to the conclusions of law drawn by the trial court, with an emphasis on a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
Conversely, a challenge to a factual finding requires review of the evidence and all
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the determination,
reversing only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
under a reasonableness standard. State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 1 15, 63 P.3d 94;
State v. Boss, 2005 UT App 520,19, 127 P.3d 1236. Clearly the standard of review for a
challenge to factual findings, which implicates the marshaling requirement, is contrary to
that for denial of a severance in that the former is determined in a light favorable to the
determination while the latter is resolved in favor of the defendant. See, Balfour at ^31,
supra. Additionally, a determination by this Court as to whether a trial court has
adequately applied the facts to the law does not require a look to the sufficiency of the
evidence itself, so clearly the standard of review affronted by the State in its brief is
incorrect and marshaling is not required in this determination.
Nonetheless, Hildreth has sufficiently marshaled the evidence in this matter albeit
in line with prior marshaling requirements inclusive of "every scrap of evidence," but still
meeting the new clarified standard of only "relevant supporting evidence." Kimball,
4

supra. Hildreth has included all evidence, not just that evidence pertaining to the
opposition or supportive of the trial court's determination, since such detailing is
necessary to meet the requirement of a challenge to the denial of the severance. All
testimony, including that of Hildreth and his witnesses, was necessary to a determination
as to (a) the connectedness of the charges, (b) whether a common scheme or plan existed
under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8A-l(l)(B), and (c) whether Hildreth was thereby
prejudiced by the denial of the severance.
The State erroneously attempts to apply the marshaling requirement to challenges
pertaining to the legal sufficiency of the evidence or conclusions of law, which would
create a substantial burden on the defendant and be of no use to this Court in review of
such matters. Requiring marshaling in challenges to severance issues would not "add[ ]
discipline and order . . . precluding an unfocused allegation" that the conclusions are
incorrect, and would not result in "requiring the appellate court to comb the record and
see if that might possibly be true." Kimball supra. This Court is knowledgeable and
well-positioned to determine whether a given set of facts have been applied correctly by
the trial courts without the added distraction towards the factual findings when such
challenge is not raised.
II.

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF PRETRIAL MOTIONS ARE NOT
FAVORED BY THIS COURT IN CRIMINAL MATTERS;
STANDARDS
OF
REVIEW
DO
NOT
DIFFER
ON
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS VERSUS DIRECT APPEALS; AND
DIRECT APPEALS FROM DENIALS OF SEVERANCE SUPPORTS
PREJUDICE DETERMINATION THROUGH CONVICTION AT
TRIAL.

(A)

Interlocutory Review Was Inappropriate in this Matter.
5

The State argues that Hildreth's challenge to the denial of the severance was more
appropriately brought by request for interlocutory review under UT. R. APP. P. 5 prior to
trial in this matter, citing Balfour at ^[31, supra, as support for their position. See, Brief of
Appellee at pp. 26-27.

The State is mistaken.

While Balfour was brought on

interlocutory review, its determination did not require such challenges to be raised in
such manner and its citation to Balfour easily evidences this.1
In 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §2337, it is well stated that, "[i]n a criminal
prosecution, in the absence of a permissive statute, an appeal will not usually lie from an
interlocutory order." It further states that, ". . .an appeal is not generally permitted from
an order made before the final determination of a case, particularly . . .where the order
affects a right that may still be vindicated after the trial." Id. Our Utah Supreme Court
has indicated that it will not issue advisory opinions on interlocutory review ". . .by
examining] a controversy that has not yet sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of
legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto." State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359,
371 (Utah 1995).
Utah has a long history of discouraging piecemeal appeals and favoring a single
appeal from a single action. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, ^f 9,
123 P.3d 393; Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,1J68, 44 P.3d 663; Kennedy v.
New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979); O'Gara v. Findlav, 7 Utah 2d 218,

1

It is important to note that Balfour additionally raised challenges to the bindover and the denial of a motion to

disqualify the prosecutions' office from his case, the merits of which were each entertained by this Court on
interlocutory review.
6

321 P.2d 953, 953-54 (1958). Judge Orme stated the purpose of this position well in a
concurring/dissenting opinion, as follows:
When leave is not sought or when it is sought but denied, the question of
whether the intermediate order was erroneous does not vaporize but is
simply pushed forward for possible consideration after the entry of final
judgment. Adherence to this precept both serves the policy in favor of one
appeal per case and assures litigants there is no need to seek appeal of every
immediate disposition along the way, as their right to fuss about such
dispositions will be fully preserved for appeal following the entry of final
judgment.
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2007 UT App 382, Tf35 at fn. 1, 174 P.3d 1,
Judge Orme concurring in part and dissenting in part; reversed on other grounds, 2009
UT44,215P.3dl52.
"Utah recognizes that when a party complies with rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and designates the final judgment in its notice of appeal, it is "not
precluded from alleging errors in any intermediate order involving the merits or
necessarily affecting the judgment as long as such errors were properly preserved."
Zions First Naf 1 Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah
1997). "When an appellant files a notice of appeal from a final judgment, he may, in his
opening brief, challenge all nonfinal prior orders and happenings which led up to that
final judgment." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At issue herein is UT. CODE ANN. §77-8a-l, which allows joinder of charges if it
can be shown that they are "(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected
together in their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or

7

plan." Initially the trial court found that the Counts2 were "connected" as they occurred
in Hildreth's home and professional offices during the course of what was purported to be
medical care by Hildreth in his capacity as a chiropractor. See, Supp. Tr. at p. 15. Hence,
the trial court concluded the Counts were properly joined and that Hildreth was not
prejudiced thereby. Id. at pp. 15-16. However, the specific testimony and evidence had
not yet been presented in its entirety for a complete understanding of whether such was
the case, and would not be elicited through testimony and other evidence until the time of
trial in this matter. Once all evidence was presented, it was clear to see that joinder of the
Counts was inappropriate. Had Hildreth raised the issue by request for review of an
interlocutory order, such evidence would not have been available for a thorough review
of the question presented herein.
(B) Standards of Review do not Differ with Interlocutory Versus Direct Appeals.
The State argues that a different standard applies when a challenge to a denial of
severance is raised in a direct appeal post-conviction rather than under Rule 5, claiming
that proof of enor does not automatically result in reversal of the conviction. See, Brief
of Appellee at pp. 27-28. "To decide whether trial court abused its discretion by denying
defendant's motion to sever charges, Court of Appeals examines whether trial court
complied with relevant Code provisions, interpreted according to common meaning of its
plain language." State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App 1997). On direct appeal of a
denial of a motion for severance, this Court has indicated that "the grant or denial of

Capitalized terms not specifically defined herein are afforded the same meaning given them in Hildreth's Brief of
Appellant.

8

severance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, so we reverse [a denial] only
if the trial judge's refusal to sever charges 'is a clear abuse of discretion in that it
sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial.'" State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d
39, 42 (Utah App. 1990) quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977). On
an interlocutory appeal taken from a denial of a motion for severance, the same standard
was applied. See, Balfour at TflO, supra.
Case law does not differentiate between a challenge to the denial of the severance
brought by request for interlocutory review versus direct appeal from a conviction, and
the State does not cite any support for such position. The denial challenged herein is
based on a constitutional right to a fair trial under U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV and UT.
CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12. To differentiate a standard of review based on when an
appeal is taken would necessarily result in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and
the Operation of Laws Clause. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; UT. CONST. ART. I §24.
(C)

Direct Appeal Was Required to Evidence Prejudice.

UT. CODE ANN.

§77-8a-l(4)(a) states that separate trials of separate counts shall

be ordered if the trial court finds a defendant is prejudiced by joinder. Doubts as to
prejudice with respect to severance requests are to be resolved in favor of a defendant.
State v. Telford, 940 P.2d 522, 525 (Utah App. 1997), citing State v. Collins, 612 P.2d
775, 777 (Utah 1980).

In acknowledging the reluctance of trial courts to grant

severances, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that such reluctance is "ill-advised and
in the long run risks greater expenditure of judicial resources." Id, citing State v.
O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1986).
9

In denials of severance, an appellate court can "survey record to determine
whether prejudicial error occurred during trial based on the ground of denial of motion to
sever, even though, at time motion was originally made, trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying it." State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976). The Utah
Supreme Court noted that its review for "prejudicial error" upon affirmation of the denial
of a motion for severance can be conducted on the same grounds as those supporting
severance, with an eye towards the trial testimony itself to reveal whether such
"prejudicial error" exists. Id.
The grounds upon which the trial court initially determined the motion for
severance in this matter were legally insufficient to deny such motion under UTAH CODE
ANN. §77-8a-l, as argued more particularly in Hildreth's opening brief in this matter.
The trial court relied only upon the contentions that they each occurred in Hildreth's
home and professional offices during the course of what was purported to be medical care
by Hildreth in his capacity as a chiropractor. See, Supp. Tr. at p. 15. Such findings were
insufficient for a denial of severance and Hildreth was forced to stand trial after such
denial, which ultimately prejudiced him in the outcome—conviction.

Regardless of

whether the grounds are found to be legally sufficient at the time the motion was denied,
Hildreth was ultimately prejudiced by such decision and this Court has the ability to
reverse on that basis in support of protecting his right to a fair trial. See, Gaxiola and
Telford, supra; U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV and UT. CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12.
III.

FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS, HARMLESSNESS MUST
BE FOUND TO BE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

10

The State has argued that no prejudice resulted regardless of whether error
occurred, affronting a "harmless" argument with respect to the challenge to the denial of
the severance in this matter. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 31-35. However, the State has
failed to show how the constitutional violation of Hildreth's right to a fair trial was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," as is required for such finding on appeal.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, "[a]mong other things, it is
normally 'within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are
carried out,' ... and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due
Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37, 41-44, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996), citing Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (citations
omitted). The Court additionally held that, "[i]t is not the [government] which bears the
burden of demonstrating that its rule is 'deeply rooted,' but rather [the defendant] who
must show that the principle of procedure violated by the rule (and allegedly required by
due process) is 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.'" Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41-44, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017, 135
L.Ed.2d 361 (1996).

11

"The primary guide in determining whether principle is fundamental, for due
process purposes, is historical practice." United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874 (C.A.IO
(N.M.) 1998). In State v. Saunders, this Court stated that it is "fundamental in our law
that a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts, not for his general character.
That principle is violated if a conviction is based on an inference that conviction is
justified because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts."
Ibid., 1999 UT 59,H 15, 992 P.2d 951. "The rules against improper use of character
evidence thus work 'to ensure that a defendant is only convicted because he committed
the charged offense and not because the jury is convinced of his cumulative bad
behavior.'" Id, citing State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118,11 24, 62 P.3d 444. This Court
acknowledged that, "[t]he rule limiting the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes, as
presently stated in rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, has existed for almost a
century in this state." Id.; see, e.g., State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 490-94 (Utah 1997);
State v. Huggins, 18 Utah 2d 219, 221, 418 P.2d 978, 979 (1966); State v. Winget 6 Utah
2d 243, 244, 310 P.2d 738, 739 (1957); State v. Torgerson, 4 Utah 2d 52, 54, 286 P.2d
800, 801 (1955); State v. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 133, 279 P.2d 914, 917 (1955); State v.
Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 535-36, 201 P.2d 764, 767 (1949); State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9,
20-22, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021-23 (1947); State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 311-12, 148 P.2d
327, 329 (1944); State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 277-81, 103 P. 250, 252 (1909).
Concerning prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court has held the following:
Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedings and the protections
accorded those accused of crime under our law, including the presumption
of innocence and the burden of the state to prove the defendant's guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe that, on appeal, when there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was prejudicial that doubt
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. This is especially true where
the error involved is one which transgresses against the exercise of a
constitutional right. Consequently, the rule which we have numerous times
stated is that if the error is such as to justify a belief that it had a substantial
adverse effect upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, in that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there may have been a different
result, then the error should not be regarded as harmless; and conversely, if
the error is such that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it was
harmless in that the result would have been the same, then the error should
not be deemed prejudicial and warrant granting a new trial.
State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).3
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has previously held that, if it ". . .finds violation of
defendant's constitutional rights, conviction can stand only if Court of Appeals is
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that error was harmless." U.S. v. Bursoa 952 F.2d
1196 (C.A.10 (N.M.) 1991), citim Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,
3

In its analysis of the "reasonably likelihood" standard, the Utah Supreme Court determined:
If we assume a spectrum of probabilities with zero percent at one end representing no likelihood
of a different result and one hundred percent at the other end representing absolute certainty of
a different result, we can array verbalizations of probabilities across that spectrum. A "mere
possibility" is at the low end of the spectrum, "near certainty" is at the high end, and "more
probable than not" is a likelihood greater than fifty percent. Of course, we cannot assign a
definite spot on the spectrum to the term "reasonable likelihood," but we can give some
guidance to the lower courts and counsel as to where a "reasonable likelihood" should fall.
The erosion-of-confidence criterion gives substance to the more theoretical "reasonable
likelihood" standard. It thus assists us in determining where on the spectrum of outcome
probabilities discussed earlier "reasonable likelihood" might appear. For an error to require
reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence
in the verdict. This is certainly above the "mere possibility" point on the spectrum. If it is "more
probable than not" that the outcome of trial would have been different, then a court cannot
possibly place confidence in the verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful reflection suggests that
confidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the "more
probable than not" portion of the spectrum. It may not be possible to define "reasonable
likelihood" much more explicitly than this, but the foregoing should be of some assistance in
deciding whether an error requires reversal.

Id. at 919-920.
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828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also, U.S. v. Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483, 485 (C.A.10
(Colo.) 1993), United States v. Masses 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982).
In the instant matter the State has charged that, even if Hildreth has proven error
occurring in the denial of severance in this matter, such error was harmless since the jury
adequately weighed the witnesses' testimonies individually and the evidence was
sufficient as to counts upon which he was convicted absent the testimony of the others. If
such is the case, then severance should have been supported by the State rather than
sought by them at the trial court level in support of judicial economy and to ensure the
defendant's right to a fair trial. However, it was not.
The State now claims any error was harmless and that prejudice did not exist, but
the State has failed to evidence how this standard of harmlessness can be met beyond a
reasonable doubt. The State's argument is cursory at best in its attempt to claim that
prejudice has not been evidenced by Hildreth's articulate arguments. Given the case of
Balfour alone, which is strikingly similar to the circumstances of Hildreth's case, it is
clear that prejudice abounds when matters not rising to the same severity are combined
with those matters that are susceptible to acquittal, as happened in this case.
Rule 404(b) violations are fundamentally constitutional in nature, as are improper
denials of severance leading to a violation of a defendant's right to a fair trial. See,
Saunders, supra; UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-l. Hence, the State was required to evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that such violations could be considered harmless in this
matter, which is has failed to do. Regardless, such violations cannot stand in this matter
14

given the fundamental constitutional rights at issue. Hildreth should not be subjected to
an improper conviction obtained through inadmissible evidence pertaining to his general
character resultant of a violation of his right to a fair trial.
"Rules that govern criminal proceedings are meant to ensure that a trial is a search
for truth and that the verdict merits confidence." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah
1987). Hence, "[i]t is entirely consistent with this aim to require that when error has
eroded a reviewing court's confidence in the outcome of a particular trial, we should start
over and conduct a new trial." Id.
IV.

THE JURY'S RELIANCE ON THE TOTALITY OF
TESTIMONY PRESENTED CULMINATED IN PREJUDICE.

THE

The State claims Hildreth is bound by the jury's determination that Weston was a
more credible witness, as the jury rejected his version of events and accepted hers. See,
Brief of Appellee at p. 23. The State further claims the jury accepted Weston's version of
the facts leaving him to be bound by his credibility determinations. Id. at p. 25. The
State also claims Hildreth cannot minimize or attack the remaining victims' testimony,
even if he was acquitted of those Counts. Id. at pp. 25-26. The State asserts the jury
presumptively accepted the other victims second guessed what happened to them when
they learned of Weston's accusations against Hildreth; however, whatever their
reasoning, the jury recognized Weston's accusations stood on a different footing. Id. at p.
32. The State is mistaken in its position.
The Utah Supreme Court has long held the following:
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It is the duty of this court to leave the question of credibility of witnesses to
the jury or fact trier and we have quite consistently adhered to that policy.
As has often been said, the jury is in a favored position to form impressions
as to the trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have the advantage of fairly
close personal contact; the opportunity to observe appearance and general
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of personalities. All of which
they may consider in connection with the reactions, manner of expression,
and apparent frankness and candor or want of it in reacting to and
answering questions on both direct and cross-examination in determining
whether, and to what extent, witnesses are to be believed. Whereas, the
appellate court is handicapped by being limited to a review of an
impersonal record.
It is not a prerequisite to credibility that a witness be entirely accurate with
respect to every detail of his testimony. If it were so, human frailties are
such that it would be seldom that a witness who testified to any extent
could be believed. The jury may evaluate the testimony of witnesses and
accept those parts which they deem credible, even though there be some
inconsistencies. An examination of the record here does not show that facts
testified to would be impossible in the light of known physical facts, or so
contradictory or uncertain as to justify a conclusion that any of the
witnesses were entirely 'unworthy of belief as plaintiff contends.
Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 395-396, 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955) (footnotes
omitted). Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held:
As we have often said, credibility is an issue for the trier of fact, in this case
the jury. See, e.g., James, 819 P.2d at 784; State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475,
477 (Utah 1989); Booker, 709 P.2d at 345; State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68
(Utah 1977). The jury necessarily accepts the testimony of certain
witnesses and discounts conflicting testimony. Fillmore Prods, v. Western
States Paving, Inc., 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979); Turner v. General
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Moreover,
as a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the jury
believed the evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d
610, 611 (Utah 1986,), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, Stewart v.
State by and through DeLand, 830 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct.App.1992); State v.
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct.App.1991); see Booker, 709 P.2d at
345.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah,1993).
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The State argues the victims, except for Weston, claimed Hildreth's actions
against them were brief and momentary, while Weston testified Hildreth was aggressive,
which the State contends Hildreth admitted. Brief of Appellee at p. 33. Hence, the State
concludes it was unlikely the other victims' accusations against Hildreth would have
roused the jury to overmastering hostility. Id. Furthermore, the State argues the other
victims' testimony impeached Hildreath's claim he would never unduly expose a patient,
that he was careful not to examine a patient alone, that he would explain what he was
doing before he touched the patient, and that he would not grope a patient's breast. Id. at
p. 34. Thus, the State argues all of the victims' testimony would be admissible at trial,
even if severance had been granted. Id.
The State, in part, agrees with Hildreth's position on appeal, that "[Beene's,
Wagner's and Wihongi's] testimony still supports the jury's findings of guilt regarding
Weston[.]" Brief of Appellee at pp. 25-26. Since Hildreth was convicted of the Counts
involving Weston, this Court will view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to those verdicts. Hamilton at 233-234. The jury was
in a unique position of fairly close personal contact with Hildreth, Weston, and the
remaining women. Gittens at 395-396. The jury was able to observe appearance and
demeanor of the witnesses, which they could consider in connection with the reactions,
manner of expression, and apparent frankness and candor or want of it in reacting to and
answering questions during their testimony. Id. The jury's position in this matter, of
hearing multiple accounts of inappropriate sexual conduct could only impact their
17

determination Hildreth was guilty of some kind of misconduct; hence, the jury returned
their verdict concerning Weston.

Had the jury not heard about multiple counts of

inappropriate sexual conduct, it is probable they may have returned a different verdict
with regards to Weston.
Hildreth makes a credible argument in his Opening Brief that the jury was aroused
into overmastering hostility against Hildreth. The only testimony refuting the victims'
accounts in this matter was Hildreth's, which the jury discounted and instead relied on
the Victims' testimony, leaving this Court to assume the jury believed the Victims
testimony in order to support the verdict. Dunn at 1213. Therefore, the testimony of the
other women, upon which it appears the jury relied in support of its verdict in its
conviction on the counts involving Weston, prejudices Hildreth in its result and reversal
is required. The trial court erred in denying the Motion to sever the charges as all the
testimony from such Motion would not have been admissible nor should the Counts have
been tried together. Thus, the failure to sever the counts and allow all the testimony to be
presented in one trial in this matter has severely prejudiced Hildreth and reversal in this
matter is required.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Hildreth respectfully requests that this Court
reverse

the denial of the Motion in this matter and take any such further action as this

Court deems necessary.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2010.

Aa&a'S. Bartholomi
Carplyn E. Howard
Attorneys for Grant Hildreth
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